

VZCZCXYZ0000  
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0041/01 0230027  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 230027Z JAN 07  
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1155  
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0125  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0946  
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY  
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0709

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000041

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2017  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [UNMIK](#) [YI](#)  
SUBJECT: QUINT STRATEGIZES IN NEW YORK ON UN PROCESS FOR  
KOSOVO

Classified By: Acting Permanent Representative Alex Wolff for Reasons 1  
.4 b/d.

[¶1.](#) (C) SUMMARY. Representatives of Quint countries (U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy) met in New York on January 18 to consider tactics for getting the Kosovo final status process to and through the Security Council. Participants considered: whether and how Special Envoy Ahtisaari's initial proposal should be formally received and distributed in New York even as it is being digested in Belgrade and Pristina; how to ensure that Ahtisaari's final report arrives at the Security Council unadulterated by the UN Secretariat and DPKO; what the role of SYG Ban would be; how the Quint should proceed on developing a resolution; how to divide Quint labor in educating Security Council members on Kosovo; how to encourage EU leadership; and how to get Kosovo more engaged in New York. The concern that overlay all these questions was how to deal with Russia. END SUMMARY.

[¶2.](#) (SBU) UKUN Deputy PermRep Karen Pierce hosted a three and a half hour Quint strategy session on Kosovo on January 18. Pierce was joined by UK Balkans Director Michael Tatham. France, Italy, and the Germany attended at the Deputy PermRep level. Acting USUN PermRep Alex Wolff and EURDAS Rosemary DiCarlo led the USG team.

New York Getting Ready To Deal With Kosovo  
-----

[¶3.](#) (C) Pierce noted that Ahtisaari does not intend to announce publicly his recommendation that Kosovo be independent when he presents his initial status proposal on February 2 to Belgrade and Pristina. The French observed that February is therefore shaping up as period of dialogue, if not negotiation, that could counter arguments in some quarters that the international community is rushing to closure on Kosovo. All agreed that the February 2 Ahtisaari document would quickly become generally available, either by leakage or formal distribution by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon. (NOTE. Our current understanding is that Ahtisaari will engage in a period of intensive consultation with the parties on his status proposal, after which he will present his final report to the Security Council -- including a recommendation that Kosovo become independent -- possibly as soon as March. END NOTE.)

[¶4.](#) (C) Ambassador Wolff referred to fears persistently expressed by members of Ahtisaari's team that the UN Secretariat is intent on re-opening the draft when it arrives

SIPDIS

in New York. The UK suspected UN Department of Political Affairs U/SYG Ibrahim Gambari as particularly likely to want to rework the special envoy's product. Other UN officials judged to warrant close attention were Department of Peacekeeping Operations U/SYG Jean-Marie Guehenno and DPKO's European Chief David Harland. Ambassador Wolff suggested that at least a subset of Quint members should engage directly with SYG Ban because Ban has made clear that he expects to play a role on Kosovo. We should be making sure, Wolff added, that Ban will bless rather than revise Ahtisaari's proposal and report.

15. (C) Potential outreach efforts discussed involving some combination of Quint members included: inviting Ahtisaari deputy Albert Rohan to New York to conduct informational seminars on the status proposal for Council members and key Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and G-77 states (a UK/German idea); having the EU demonstrate "a positive EU plan on Serbia" to Council members concerned about Serbia's reaction to Ahtisaari's proposal (a French idea); asking Ahtisaari to directly engage the South Africans given his positive history with the African National Council on Namibia (a UK idea); and clearly demonstrating to Russia that the EU is unified behind the Ahtisaari draft (a German idea, although Germany deflected a U.S. push for its speedy implementation by saying the EU would need "ten days at minimum to have a position" on the draft).

16. (C) Ambassador Wolff cautioned that inactivity in New York by those who support Ahtisaari's effort could encourage others to alter the draft or work to delay the arrival of the final version at the Security Council. He suggested that an apparent cooling of Ban's sense of urgency on Kosovo of late may be the product of lobbying by Russian PermRep Churkin. DAS DiCarlo noted that Ahtisaari intends to share the initial draft of his proposal with Ban, who will be free to circulate

it. The group agreed that some manner of Quint strategy was therefore in order in New York in the aftermath of February 2 with its specifics depending on whether Ban chooses to make formal distribution of the draft.

Russia

-----

17. (C) Virtually every topic discussed during the long session featured commentary on Russia. German Deputy PermRep Von Ungern-Sternberg expressed concern that Russia may seek to delay resolution of Kosovo until the G-8 summit in June, a prospect that several participants quickly dismissed as undesirable. Italy's Deputy Permrep Mantovani told the group not to worry about Italy being on board but then stressed that EU unity should involve "lowering our expectations enough" to be able to include Russia and make our ideas acceptable to them. DAS DiCarlo countered that the Ahtisaari proposal, as previewed to date, is already "very generous regarding Kosovo minorities" -- so generous that it would represent a significant financial burden for Kosovo -- and that this generosity should resonate with Council members and other UN member-states developing positions on the recognition of Kosovo. Ambassador Wolff said that our job is complicated by Russian PermRep Churkin's personal interest and involvement in the Kosovo issue and by the fact that Russia's advocacy of prolonged negotiations would seem persuasive to the uninformed. He said the Quint, nonetheless, has good cards to play, including the OIC card, provided in part by Indonesia's presence on the Council, and, perhaps, a NAM card if handled adroitly. He said we also have to be seen by Russia and others as engaged with Serbia and not its enemy.

18. (C) Returning to the question of the OIC card, French Deputy Permrep LaCroix noted that Qatar and Indonesia had raised with him the desirability of engaging the OIC on Kosovo. Ambassador Wolff said that Indonesia has generally shown signs, early in its Council tenure, of being a sensible

and responsible member and could provide a key to approaching China as well. UK's Tatham said that his late-December Beijing trip had given him confidence China will cooperate so long as it is kept in the information loop. Pierce speculated there was a personal alliance between the Russian and Chinese PermReps here that had no firm policy anchor in Beijing and Moscow. Summing up the Russia/China state of play on Kosovo in the Security Council, Ambassador Wolff said, "The worst we'll get from the Chinese is an abstention, and an abstention is the best we can hope for from the Russians."

#### Options For Drafting A Resolution

-----

¶9. (C) Quint members also considered the UNSCR drafting process, all agreeing that some kind of resolution should be sought to supercede 1244, provide mandates for post-status international military/civilian presences, and open the door to Kosovo's independence. UK's Pierce suggested that the primary options seem to be giving the pen to the P-5 or to the Coordinating and Drafting Group (CDG, the Contact Group plus European nations on the Security Council). Germany's Deputy Permrep expressed a strong preference for the CDG, noting that CDG meetings could be held at the ambassadorial level if need be. Pierce said the logical choice would have been the Contact Group (CG), except that Russia's position would probably mean that the CG would fail to achieve unity, a failure that could end with giving out the unhelpful message that the CG is falling apart. (COMMENT. This rationale might also eliminate the CDG as a potential drafter except that the CDG has a working-level dimension that could serve to float suggestions on resolution nuances to the Russians. END COMMENT.) Ambassador Wolff suggested that the involvement of every EU member on the Council in the drafting process would be conducive to a desirable EU unity and leadership on the Kosovo issue and that the Russians should be brought in as early in the drafting process as the situation allowed. (NOTE. The USG has already taken the initiative within the Quint to keep the pen on a new UNSCR. U/S Burns distributed elements of a new resolution to Quint political directors on January 17. END NOTE.)

#### Kosovo Albanians Need To Work New York

-----

¶10. (C) Ambassador Wolff pressed for a Kosovo Albanian presence in New York as urgently required to help counter lobbying by the Russian and Serbian missions. Pierce seconded that idea as essential to personalize the issue of Kosovo independence for Council members, non-Council UN members who may soon have to decide whether to recognize a sovereign Kosovo, NGO's, the OIC, and the press. She said the UK presses the issue with Kosovo Albanian leaders at every opportunity and urged others to do the same. As an aid to Quint lobbying efforts, Pierce added that Quint Balkans' Directors would soon produce in capitals a common "script" that could be used by New York missions.

¶11. (SBU) DAS DiCarlo cleared on this message.

WOLFF